The international community has developed multiple approaches to address large-scale human rights (HR) violations (e.g., genocide). In the current contribution, we first provide a review of different approaches to intergroup violence (AIVs), and explain how these approaches might (re-)establish HR consciousness and behavior in postconflict societies. We then integrate this literature with the HR literature and propose a framework to guide future research on the psychological underpinnings of different AIVs and their effects on HR. Informed by HR research, we argue for a multidimensional conception of HR consciousness (encompassing HR knowledge, endorsement, commitment, and restriction) and a distinction of internalized HR behavior versus HR compliance. These outcomes should be affected by an AIV through appraisals of the AIV (e.g., perceived fairness) and subsequent perceptions of ingroup and outgroup norms, perceptions of the outgroup, and emotions (e.g., anger). Further, appraisals should be affected largely by people's group memberships and preexisting belief and attitudinal systems. Rather than providing an overall research program with a coherent and specific set of hypotheses, we provide a conceptual framework that clarifies what, according to AIV and HR literature, future research should focus on, and that can help to systematically take stock of past research.
ened moral concern beyond group and state boundaries. The concept of universal rights has been codified into the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the European Convention for Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), among others. Overarching entities such as the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court have been established to regulate interpersonal, intrastate, and interstate behavior relevant to the protection of HR. On the other hand, even the most basic HR, such as the right to physical integrity, continue to be violated on a regular basis, often causing humanitarian crises and international tensions (Donnelly, 2007; Pavlish & Ho, 2009; Uvin, 2004) . In the 20th century alone, HR violations within and between nations caused more than 200 million human deaths and countless other human injuries (e.g., Leitenberg, 2006) . Compounding this continuing problem, research suggests that suffering and perpetrating HR violations erode people's HR behavior in the future (e.g., Elcheroth, 2006; Widom, 1989) . In response to this problem, the international community has developed several approaches to (re)build HR consciousness and behavior in societies that have suffered systemic HR violations in the form of intergroup violence.
Focusing on the most severe and large-scale instances of HR violations, in this contribution we review multidisciplinary literature on the use of HR-focused interventions to approach intergroup violence (e.g., trials, truth commissions) with the goal of (re)building HR consciousness and behavior in postconflict societies. To this end, we draw on the main theoretical and empirical work in different literatures (e.g., postconflict justice, HR) and different disciplines (e.g., political science, legal studies, psychology). Naturally, these literatures are diverse in arguments, opinion, and approaches. As our goals here are to focus on commonalities that cut across literatures, as well as to integrate and synthesize, we will not be able to give the detailed attention to the complexities and multitudes that any one literature or discipline truly deserves. For the sake of these goals, we will sometimes simplify or make generalizations for which exceptions are bound to exist. Similarly, our focus on intergroup violence will neglect HR that are economic or social in nature. As we will show, scholarship on the effects of approaches to intergroup violence (AIVs) suffers from a lack of theorizing and rigorous empirical research establishing cause-effect relationships (cf. Borer, 2006, p. 25; Duggan, 2012; Mendeloff, 2004; Thoms, Ron, & Paris, 2010) . We argue that these weaknesses are due, in large part, to a lack of incorporating past HR research into this scholarship.
We then leverage the literature on HR to derive a general framework that can help to better understand past research and inspire more rigorous and systematic future research. To the latter end, the framework can guide researchers in their formulation of theory-driven, testable hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms of AIVs and their effects on HR consciousness and behavior, and thus guide policy-relevant research on the link between AIVs and HR. To develop our framework, we draw on research on attitudes toward and social representations of HR to (a) distinguish between different forms of HR behavior (internalized behavior vs. compliance) and consciousness (configured by HR knowledge, endorsement, commitment, and restriction); (b) explain these outcome variables by appraisals of a given AIV (e.g., perceived fairness), as well as subsequent perceptions of ingroup and outgroup norms, views of the outgroup, and emotions (e.g., anger); and (c) account for the psychological realities of different groups (e.g., victims
1 and perpetrators and their respective experiences; cultural values) as well as different individuals within groups (e.g., right-wing authoritarians). We hope this framework will help to take stock of past research and inspire future research to answer the questions of when and how specific AIVs are likely to be helpful, harmful, or irrelevant in (re)building HR consciousness and behavior in postconflict societies.
Erosion of HR
HR violations have immediate effects on those who suffer them. At the collective level, the suffering of HR violations is associated with a greater desire for accountability (Backer, 2010) and formal justice (Elcheroth, 2006; cf. Mendeloff, 2004 ; see also Darley & Pittman, 2003) , which, if left unaddressed, can motivate retaliatory violence (Lickel, 2012) . For instance, a study on 12,047 people from 14 communities of the People on War data set found that communities with a higher rate of victims more readily adopt HR norms than communities with a lower rate of victims (Elcheroth, 2006) . Similarly, a study conducted in Cambodia (a country with a high rate of victims) found that Cambodians strongly aspire to commit to the rule of law (Gibson, Sonis, & Hean, 2010) . Although the concept of justice can differ across cultures (e.g., procedural justice; Lind & Earley, 1992) , the need for some form of justice appears to be widely stable across societies that have suffered systemic HR violations (Orentlicher, 2007, p. 22) . Furthermore, conflict and injustice have been shown to positively affect how people position themselves on HR issues in the future (Doise, 2003; Doise, Spini, & Clé-mence, 1999) . Such respect for HR, when mutual, is associated with lower levels of international conflict (Sobek, Abouharb, & Ingram, 2006) and greater levels of peace between nations (Peterson & Graham, 2011) , possibly through transfer of HR norms from the national to the international level (cf. Caprioli, 2003; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003 ). Yet countries that have a poor HR record have been shown to repeat cycles of HR violations despite their aspirations to conform with HR norms and laws (Davenport, 1995 (Davenport, , 1996 Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1999; Richards, Gelleny, & Sacko, 2001) . Thus, the collective-level effects of HR violations seem to increase the desire for justice and aspirations to live up to HR, but translating these into positive changes in actual HR behavior is rather unlikely. In other words, research suggests that, on the collective level, HR violations have positive effects on HR consciousness but negative effects on HR behavior.
Research on the individual level is more aligned with the negative than the positive collective-level effects of HR violations. In line with the common argument that HR abuses erode respect for HR, the previously mentioned study on the People on War data set has shown that, on the individual level, victims of war voice less support for international humanitarian law (IHL) than nonvictims (Elcheroth, 2006) . There is converging evidence that victims of violence are, on average, more prone than nonvictims to becoming perpetrators of violence themselves (Widom, 1989) . Similarly, HR violations can make those who perpetrated them more likely to commit HR violations in the future. For instance, research suggests that killing increases the likelihood of future killing in an effort to render the first kill less psychologically burdensome (Martens, Kosloff, Greenberg, Landau, & Schmader, 2007) .
Beyond these immediate effects, HR violations also reverberate across time and space. Even those not directly affected by HR violations-be it bystanders or future generations of former victim and perpetrator groups-can develop anxiety of becoming victims themselves (e.g., Wohl & Branscombe, 2009 ) and increase their perceptions of outgroups as hostile, untrustworthy, and threatening . They can therefore take "preemptive" measures that often render future intergroup violence (i.e., HR violations) more likely. Among members of former perpetrator groups, the group's past HR violations often trigger psychological defense mechanisms such as victim blaming or dehumanization, ultimately increasing the likelihood of future HR violations (e.g., Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & GinerSorolla, 2010; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013) . This perpetuating effect of HR violations has also been found on the collective level, with HR violations in the form of intergroup violence spilling over to other forms of HR violations (Diaz-Veizades, Widaman, Little, & Gibbs, 1995; McClosky & Brill, 1983) , and spreading from one group or region to others (e.g., Crescenzi, 2007) .
In sum, research on HR violations indicates three things. First, if HR violations remain unaddressed, HR behavior appears to be disrupted and the likelihood for future HR violations increases on both individual and collective levels. Second, if HR violations are addressed properly, possible positive effects of HR violations on HR consciousness might be translated into positive changes in HR behavior and therefore decrease the likelihood of future HR violations. Third, the indication that HR violations lead to a psychological need for some form of justice points to a promising way to effectively address them: by using tools of international justice and law (e.g., HR trials, international criminal tribunals, truth commissions).
2 Therefore, the question arises if and, if so, how HR consciousness and behavior can be (re)built after systemic, large-scale HR violations.
(Re)Building HR After Their Violations
Reacting to the frequent erosion of HR, the international community has adopted different approaches to secure HR, resulting in the growing institutionalization of international humanitarian law and, more generally, the preeminent commitment to safeguarding basic rights of ev-2 Although there are other alternative justice mechanisms that are more culturally specific (e.g., Gacaca in Rwanda, mato oput in Uganda; e.g., Arriaza & Roht-Arriaza, 2008; Huyse & Salter, 2008; Quinn, 2007; Staub, 2013) , we focus here primarily on formal and widely used AIVs because they are also the foci of the existing literature on transitional justice (TJ). These AIVs have been increasingly implemented across many different cultures. Nevertheless, we return to the issue of culture when describing our model. ery individual (e.g., UDHR; United Nations, 1948) . Probably the most well-known consideration of HR law and IHL is their use to protect against intergroup violence (e.g., ethnic cleansing, genocide). Slowly replacing the realpolitik tradition of approaching HR violations with impunity, the nascent field of transitional justice (TJ) and IHL uses various accountability mechanisms such as trials or truth commissions. Although TJ traditionally focuses on societies transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, we take a broader approach focusing on any society transitioning from large-scale violence-hence, the more general term approaches to intergroup violence (for arguments to abandon the specific focus on transitions to democracy in favor of a more general focus, see Carothers, 2002 ; see also Arthur, 2009 ). Similarly, although the original goal of TJ was democratic state-building, most scholars and practitioners agree that a second major goal that has emerged is the fostering of HR consciousness and behavior (e.g., Abrams & Hayner, 2002; International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, 2006; Kaye, 1997; Leebaw, 2008; Minow, 1998 ; for a diverging minority opinion, see Mendeloff, 2004) .
Although all approaches to large-scale HR violations began in the legal-juridical and/or political domain (Duggan, 2012) , the achievement of their goals depends not only on systemlevel factors (e.g., rule of law, institutions) but also on the people complying with or breaking HR laws, and conforming to or violating HR norms. The goals of (re)building HR consciousness and behavior imply the goal to effect psychological change among members of (former) victim and perpetrator groups as well as bystanders. Thus, we argue that AIVs need also to be investigated from a psychological perspective in terms of their effects on individuals. After all, "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed" (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1945) .
AIVs
A wide variety of AIVs exist: criminal tribunals or trials, lustration (banning perpetrators from public office), truth commissions, apology, reparations, public monuments commemorating victims, conditional amnesty, individual pardon, and blanket amnesty or impunity (Crocker, 1999; Minow, 1998) . These AIVs can be distinguished along the lines of retributive and restorative justice. Retributive justice refers to the unilateral imposition of punishment on perpetrators, whereas restorative justice refers to bilaterally restoring dignity to victims (see Darley & Pittman, 2003) . The difference between these two types of justice is widely seen in process rather than substance, in the sense that means such as punishment can be used retributively or restoratively. What matters is whether justice is achieved through a unilateral process with perpetrator and victim as largely passive objects, or through a bilateral process with perpetrator and victim engaging with each other as agents in constructive healing (e.g., Braithwaite, 1999; Gromet & Darley, 2009; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006) . Despite the flexibility of means such as punishment to be used either retributively or restoratively, the aforementioned AIVs use their respective primary means in a fixed fashion and can therefore be clearly distinguished along the lines of retributive and restorative justice. Only blanket amnesty and impunity (i.e., perpetrators' exemption from accountability; McSherry & Mejia, 1992; Penrose, 1999) form a third category of their own, clearly located outside the realms of justice and law. In the following, we will largely distinguish between TJ and IHL proponents, on the one side, who generally agree that some form of accountability will facilitate the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior, and impunity proponents, on the other side, who disagree.
Although for the sake of brevity, we are collapsing across different AIVs, as well as different designs of the same AIV (e.g., different designs of truth commissions), we do not suggest that all AIVs should have the same effects. As explained in detail elsewhere, different AIVs follow different logics, and there is a wealth of literature arguing for how these should lead to different outcomes (e.g., Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010b) . At the same time, however, different AIVs and their underlying mechanisms and consequences can, and should, be investigated in a similar fashion to enable comparisons. Further, they should be compared with the "baseline" of impunity. Thus, with space limitations in mind, and in the service of a framework that allows for the investigation and comparison of the multitude of AIVs, we distinguish here primarily between accountability and impunity, while explicitly mentioning which findings focus on which type of accountability (e.g., trials or truth commissions). In doing so, we also follow others who suggest folding TJ and IHL into an "anti-impunity" or "accountability" perspective (e.g., Arthur, 2009; Mendeloff, 2004) .
Impunity/Blanket Amnesty
Among the many cases of intergroup violence approached with impunity are the genocide against the Armenians by the Turks, and the genocide against the Hereros by the Germans. A more recent example is Sudan's government, which, despite threats of accountability, at the time of writing, enjoys de facto impunity while continuing to oppress, marginalize, and kill its own citizens. It is important to note that impunity has been, and continues to be, used as an active realpolitik strategy that, in the eyes of its proponents, yields the best chances for (re)building HR after a conflict has ended. In the 1980s, scholars in political science, international relations, security studies, and law generally concluded that accountability mechanisms were not only politically untenable, but also likely to undermine the (re)establishment of HR in postconflict societies. Therefore, the general recommendation was that societies and states transitioning from mass violence should not hold perpetrators accountable (e.g., Huntington, 1993) . Many scholars of international relations and international law are currently making very similar arguments to those made in the past, insisting that impunity will create space for the (re)establishment of HR by not provoking perpetrators and therefore preventing future HR violations in the long run (Cobban & Cobban, 2006; Goldsmith & Krasner, 2003; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003 .
Impunity critics, on the other hand, argue that impunity will hinder or even hurt the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior, leading to future HR violations in the form of revenge violence (Pankhurst, 1999) , by not dampening victims' usually highly salient revenge motives (Bass, 2000; Ivković & Hagan, 2006; Lutz & Sikkink, 2001; Sriram, 2003) , or even consciously and unconsciously rendering HR violations as readily available options (Akhavan, 2001) . Although the impunity approach to intergroup violence might be morally objectionable to many, it is based on logically valid arguments. Therefore, empirical research should give it due consideration and investigate whether impunity indeed facilitates the restoration of HR consciousness and behavior, as its proponents argue.
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Accountability
In contrast to the many cases of impunity, historically relatively few cases of intergroup violence have been approached with TJ/IHL mechanisms. Among the most well-known examples of intergroup violence approached with accountability are the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials against the perpetrators of WWII in Nazi Germany and Japan. More recent prominent examples are the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, as well as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Indeed, over the last several decades, the use of TJ/IHL mechanisms has proliferated throughout the world. Between 1979 and 2004, of the world's 192 countries and territories, 49 had a least one transitional HR trial and 34 have used truth commissions. Moreover, more than half of the 84 new and transitional countries in this time period attempted some form of trial or truth commission; TJ/IHL mechanisms are not isolated events but have, in recent decades, become widespread practice occurring in most countries after intergroup violence (Sikkink & Walling, 2007 ; see also Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010a) .
TJ/IHL proponents argue that TJ/IHL mechanisms will promote the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior by engineering a climate of justice that dampens or "channels" victims' revenge motives (see Akhavan, 2001; Chapman, 2007; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005) ; formally and publicly acknowledging that past HR violations were un-acceptable (e.g., Honeyman et al., 2004) , in an effort to avoid myths that might otherwise facilitate future violence (Byman, 2002; Van Evera, 1994) ; reestablishing common norms and values (e.g., Minow, 2002) ; enhancing people's understanding of the root causes of intergroup violence (e.g., Staub, 2004) ; restoring perceived security and trust of citizens in institutions (cf. Hamber, 2012) ; and facilitating apologies by perpetrators and forgiveness by victims (e.g., Staub, 2005 ; for an excellent overview, see Menkel-Meadow, 2007) . TJ/IHL critics, on the other hand, argue that TJ/IHL mechanisms will hinder or even hurt the (re)establishment of HR by provoking perpetrators (e.g., Colson, 2000) , normalizing extreme violence through repeated exposure to a public ritual of violence and forgiveness, and spurring dangerous identity-based debates over history and truth (Chapman & Spong, 2003; Pankhurst, 1999; Wilson, 2001) .
Empirical Evidence for Effects of AIVs
Although there is a substantial body of literature on AIVs, this literature is largely theoretical. Despite a recent increase in attention to questions of impact and evaluation of TJ mechanisms (e.g., van der Merwe, Baxter, & Chapman, 2009), empirical research on AIVs has been scarce. Here we review, without claims of exhaustiveness, what has been empirically investigated with respect to accountability mechanisms and impunity.
Impunity/Blanket Amnesty
Past research has shown that among third parties (i.e., bystanders), observed injustice leads to negative emotions (Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011) and security concerns (Skitka, 2003) , and impunity leads to feelings of incompleteness (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002) . In line with these findings, Lykes, Beristain, and Pérez-Armiñan (2007, Study 1) reported that impunity led Guatemalan survivors of intergroup violence to experience dissociating and withdrawal cognitions, negative emotions, and self-defeating and selfisolating behavior. Similarly, impunity has been associated with psychological problems of torture survivors (Basoglu, Jaranson, Mollica, & Kastrup, 2001) . Remarkably, impunity proponents' focus on AIVs' positive effects on perpetrators has not led to empirical research. Therefore it will be important to close this gap and compare impunity to accountability among members of perpetrator as well as victim groups.
Accountability
Like impunity, trials seem to be associated with negative emotions for survivors (and perpetrators; Kanyangara, Rimé, Philippot, & Yzerbyt, 2007) . At the same time, however, trials are also associated with survivors' improved psychological adjustment (Kaminer, Stein, Mbanga, & Zungu-Dirwayi, 2001; Staub et al., 2005) and empowerment (Lykes et al., 2007;  but also see Hamber, 2009 , on truth commissions' potential for retraumatization). Likewise, although the South African TRC was experienced negatively emotionally (Colvin, 2008; Cuéllar, 2005 ; Grunebaum-Ralph, 2001 ), despite suggestions to the contrary (Grunebaum, 2002), its participants appeared to benefit from it in terms of self-efficacy beliefs and self-esteem when compared with nonparticipants (Backer, 2005) . Similarly, and specifically focusing on TJ/IHL mechanisms' effects on HR, Gibson (2004a Gibson ( , 2004b reported that South Africans who viewed their truth commission on national TV developed a deeper HR consciousness than those who did not view the truth commission on TV.
Extending the focus on HR to trials, a study of 93 democratizing countries found more HR trials to be associated with less state-level repression, even controlling for the presence of violent conflict; truth commissions independently decreased state-level repression (Kim & Sikkink, 2010) . Likewise, a study of 16 Latin American countries found trials and truth commissions to be associated with reinforcement of state-level HR (Martin Beristain, Páez, & González, 2000) . Moreover, qualitative and historical comparative analyses have found no indications of truth commissions obstructing intergroup reconciliation and peace (e.g., Hayner, 1994; Kaye, 1997) , a notion that has been reiterated by quantitative studies for both trials and truth commissions (Dancy, 2010; Gates, Binningsbo, & Lie, 2007) . A recent analysis of HR trials in Latin America, for example, found no evidence that trials hurt the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior (Sikkink & Walling, 2007) .
Notwithstanding the positive evidence for TJ/ IHL mechanisms, a national poll conducted in 1998 found that two thirds of South African respondents perceived the revelations from their truth commission as having made people angrier and having complicated racial relationships in South Africa (Hayner, 2001) . Less than one fifth of respondents perceived the truth commission as having led to reconciliation (Hayner, 2001) . Additionally, it is uncertain whether individual-level reconciliation leads to or facilitates national-level reconciliation (cf., Allan & Allan, 2000; Hamber, 2009; Hamber & Wilson, 2002) . These findings are mirrored in other analyses of truth commission hearings that found acts of apology or forgiveness in response to past atrocities to be very rare (e.g., Chapman, 2007) , corroborating findings on the scarcity of effective intergroup apologies (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2008; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008 Wohl, Hornsey, & Bennett, 2012) . Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that survivors or witnesses who testified before the South African TRC, including those who experienced catharsis, experienced effects of healing in the long term (Allan & Allan, 2000 ; for similar observations in Mozambique and Sierra Leone, see Millar, 2010) .
Similarly, in a longitudinal study, initial high approval of the conditional amnesty offered by the South African TRC in 2002 to 2003 decreased significantly by 2008 as a result of a decrease in perceived fairness of and satisfaction with the TRC (Backer, 2010) . However, this decrease did not indicate a preference for impunity; on the contrary, in 2008, a majority of South Africans favored criminal accountability, even at the risk of political instability (Backer, 2010) . With respect to trials, an analysis of 32 postconflict societies found that trials antagonize peace spoilers (e.g., former perpetrators), and successes of truth commissions were attributed to amnesties rather than truth-seeking or truth-telling (Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003 . Whereas some scholars have observed consciously forgoing formal justice in several cases (e.g., Cambodia, post-civil-war China and Russia, post-Franco Spain, Mozambique, Namibia) as leading to peace and improved HR records (for details, see Mendeloff, 2004; Zalaquett, 1995) , others have attempted to reconcile the mixed findings on trials and truth commissions by pointing out that truth commissions alone tend to have negative effects on HR, but in combination with trials and amnesties have positive effects on HR (Olsen, Payne, Reiter, & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010) .
The critical view of TJ/IHL mechanisms also finds tangential support in research showing that perpetrators usually regard their actions as not immoral (e.g., Leidner & Castano, 2012; Leidner et al., 2010; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010) . They therefore feel unjustly victimized when their group receives unilateral punishment and are thus motivated to "retaliate" (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Mikula & Wenzel, 2000) . Survey data showing that a large part of the (Bosnian) Serb public views the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as an anti-Serb institution (Akhavan, 2001 ) underscores this point.
Summary and Open Questions
Although the empirical research reviewed above is commendable and even impressive given the relatively recent (re)emergence of interest in and use of AIVs, it tends not to go beyond (comparative) case studies, counterfactual arguments, or nonexperimental studies, and is largely inconclusive. Research on AIVs' causal effects on the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior is nonexistent (see Borer, 2006; Ivković & Hagan, 2006; Thoms et al., 2010) , leaving TJ/IHL mechanisms' effects on people's respect for and future violations of HR poorly understood (cf. Duggan, 2012; Mendeloff, 2004) . If anything, there are preliminary indications that impunity may be unlikely to promote the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior, and that TJ/IHL mechanisms may be unlikely to hinder or hurt the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior. Yet, it remains unclear whether impunity is simply ineffective or whether it hinders the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior. Similarly, it remains unclear whether TJ/IHL mechanisms are simply ineffective or if and, if so, when they can promote the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior. The possibility of ineffectiveness is echoed by the forgiveness literature that views retributive justice as a barrier to forgiveness (e.g., Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992; McCullough, Sandage, & Worthington, 1997) , and fueled by the justice literature showing that retributive justice can obstruct forgiveness (Karremans & Van Lange, 2005) . The possibility of effectiveness, on the other hand, is in line with findings that the values of justice, forgiveness, and reconciliation are strongly positively correlated and share the goal of promoting the welfare of others (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987 Schwartz & Huismans, 1995) , particularly with regard to restorative justice (Strelan, Feather, & McKee, 2008; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2010) .
Given the proclaimed goals of (re)building HR consciousness and behavior, scholarship on AIVs would benefit from a connection to the HR literature, which has thus far been separate from the AIV literature. Therefore, leveraging the flourishing research on HR and its violations (cf. Poe, Rost, & Carey, 2006) , in the following, we will take a first step in integrating the HR literature with the TJ/IHL literature, and distill this integration into a framework that allows researchers to investigate the effects of TJ/IHL on HR consciousness and behavior in a more rigorous, systematic, and exhaustive manner than has thus far taken place.
Injecting HR Research in AIV Research: An Integrative Framework
This review of the literature on the effects of AIVs evidences the need for rigorous empirical and comparative investigations in order to establish cause-effect relationships between AIVs and HR consciousness and behavior. One of the main reasons why past research on the effects of AIVs is inconclusive is the lack of conceptual and operational clarity in the HRrelated outcome variables (cf. Borer, 2006, p. 26; Thoms et al., 2010) . Even the few quantitative studies on AIVs and their HR outcomes focus on state-level outcomes, which tend to be crudely measured because they are hard to observe and judge (cf. Brahm, 2004 , and Sikkink & Walling, 2006 , as reported in Martin Beristain et al., 2000 . Incorporating research on HR can help clarify these outcome variables.
Additionally, a psychological perspective focusing on individual-level HR outcomes can help by rendering HR outcomes easier to observe in more controlled settings and complementing the emerging quantitative literature on state-level HR outcomes (Kim & Sikkink, 2010; Olsen et al., 2010b) . Specifically, HR research can inform what HR consciousness and behavior should or can look like; which kinds of HR consciousness and behavior are (re)established by an AIV and which are not; and how, why, and for whom the AIV can (re)establish them. In answering these questions, it is useful to create an integrative framework, identifying what may otherwise be overlooked and remain unexamined, therefore helping to establish a more detailed and conclusive body of past and future research on the link between AIVs and HR. We start by presenting the complete framework (see Figure 1 ) and then address each component, how it is informed by HR research and The framework uses research on attitudes toward, and social representations of, HR to distinguish between different forms of HR behavior (internalized behavior vs. compliance) and consciousness (configured by HR knowledge, endorsement, commitment, and restriction). It explains these outcome variables by appraisals of a given AIV (e.g., perceived fairness), subsequent perceptions of ingroup and outgroup norms, and of the outgroup, and outgroup-and ingroup-directed emotions (e.g., anger). Recognizing that these process variables lie in the eye or mind of the beholder, and given the demonstrated need to align societal policies (e.g., policies on crime) with the psychological realities of society's members (Darley, 2001; Robinson & Darley, 1995 , the framework further accounts for the psychological realities of different groups (e.g., victims and perpetrators), and of different individuals within groups (e.g., right-wing authoritarians). Although our framework takes a psychological, and therefore individual-level, perspective, it is important to note that the framework's components can and should affect group-level phenomena and processes; perceived ingroup norms, for instance, should influence the actual ingroup norms at the group level.
An often overlooked but important variable in research on AIVs is cultural influence. Clearly, the effects of AIVs will depend on preexisting cultural values and views of concepts such as justice, morality, or healing. In Cambodia, for instance, respect for the rule of law was very high, even before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) began their work (Gibson et al., 2010) , and this "preexisting cultural condition" needs to be taken into account when investigating the impact of the ECCC on HR. The importance of cultural differences is further corroborated by data indicating a preference for truth commissions in Latin America, but trials in Europe (Olsen et al., 2010a) . This logic also extends to different groups or communities within a society. In Uganda, for example, war-affected nonAcholi communities were considerably more likely to prefer trials over amnesty than waraffected Acholi communities, which has been attributed to cultural differences between Acholis and non-Acholis (Pham, Vinck, Wierda, Stover, & di Giovanni, 2005) . The same is true for truth commissions exported from the West to Sierra Leone and Peru, in which qualitative case studies have found to have negative individuallevel effects within Sierra Leonean and Peruvian cultural contexts, respectively (Millar, 2010; Theidon, 2006a Theidon, , 2006b . Although culture is not explicitly featured in the visualization of our framework above, it is accounted for by both group membership and interindividual differences, as groups, and members within a group, can differ in their cultural values. As the aforementioned research suggests, it will be important for researchers to measure cultural values on the group or community level, as well as on the individual level.
Our framework deviates from past approaches to the study of the effects of AIVs on HR in three important ways. First, we have developed a more contextualized model than previous research, taking into account processes underlying social identity and thus providing more explanatory power (cf. Clayton & Opotow, 2003) . Rather than viewing people's identity-based biases as a limitation (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2003) , we explicitly incorporate them to better understand the underlying mechanisms of AIVs and their effects on HR consciousness and behavior. Second, our framework's systematicity allows researchers to derive new hypotheses that have been overlooked in past theoretical and empirical scholarship. Third, although our framework is most concerned with leveraging HR research to inform and improve future scholarship on the effects of AIVs on HR, it can also contribute to HR research per se. For instance, the link of HR consciousness and behavior to appraisals, norm perceptions, and emotions should inform research on HR attitudes and behavior in general, and we hope other researchers will extrapolate and apply it to other contexts. In the following, we will elaborate on the framework's specification of different variables and on each of its components, pointing to variables that HR research indicates to be important to consider in future AIV research, and providing examples of hypotheses derived from the framework. In doing so, it is not our intention to provide an overall research program with a coherent and specific set of hypotheses. Rather, our aim is to conceptually clarify on what, according to AIV and HR literature, fu-ture research should focus, and provide examples of how it could do so.
Specification of Variables
As with any model, there will be questions about why we picked some variables over others; about the directionality of the effects we specified between the variables we did pick; and about conceptualizing the role of the variables as exogenous versus endogenous, independent versus dependent, or mediators versus moderators. We do not mean to imply that the relationship between AIVs and HR-should there be one-only works in one direction. HR might also affect AIVs in the sense that an existing culture of or personal beliefs about HR may lead to support for AIVs (cf. Gibson et al., 2010; Mendeloff, 2004) . Indeed, we contend that the relationship between AIVs and HR, if it does exist, is likely to be bidirectional. Yet given the predominant focus in both the field of postconflict justice and the field of HR, it is particularly the direction from AIVs to HR that needs special scientific consideration and evaluation, and thus the opposite direction is not reflected in our model. Similarly, we chose not to focus on other dependent variables such as peace or reconciliation. Peace, for example, may be related to HR, but is ultimately distinct; and reconciliation may not even be closely related to HR in the first place. These issues are often conflated in the literature, but they should be investigated independently; here, given the focus of this special issue, we limit our focus to HR. This leaves our moderating and mediating variables. The primacy and moderating role of group membership and interindividual differences (as moderators) should be easily agreeable. After all, AIVs are highly unlikely to exert influence on HR by changing group memberships or people's position on interindividual difference variables, as both are usually very stable within each individual. It is much more plausible that AIVs will exert influence on HR differently for some people than for others, depending on people's group memberships and position on interindividual difference variables. Hence, both should be conceptualized as moderators, not mediators. Other potential moderators may exist, but are unlikely to be as influential. Culture, as we explained earlier, we see as a special, and especially important, factor that is reflected in our model by group membership as well as interindividual differences.
Things are less clear regarding appraisals, perceptions (of ingroup and outgroup norms and of the outgroup) and emotions, both in terms of their primacy over other "contenders" and their role as mediators rather than moderators. Admittedly, these proposed mediators could also be conceptualized as moderators. For instance, the more preexisting anger victims direct at perpetrators, the less they might comply with HR after impunity but not after trials; or the less preexisting empathy perpetrators have for victims, the more they might comply with HR after impunity as opposed to other AIVs. Yet, in the present context of severe rather than moderate HR violations, people's perceptions and behavioral intentions have been shown to be insensitive to moderating variables of this kind (Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004) . Most importantly, when investigating the consequences of AIVs, it is theoretically and empirically more interesting to assess how AIVs affect these variables in affecting HR. This way, claims made in the literature on AIVs-for instance, that trials or truth commissions decrease anger and dehumanization-can be tested empirically. In similar fashion, empathy and negative affect, respectively, have been investigated not only as antecedents but also as consequences of apology (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997), forgiveness (Wenzel, Turner, & Okimoto, 2010) , and retribution (Carlsmith, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008) . Further, investigating the emotional and normative consequences of appraisals of AIVs (e.g., perceived fairness) will advance theories of justice, which have been criticized for neglecting emotions and, to a lesser extent, norms (cf. Clayton & Opotow, 2003) .
With respect to other mediating variables our model might neglect, the most obvious candidates are variables commonly featured in rational-choice models (e.g., deterrence; see Kim & Sikkink, 2010) . A sizable literature attests to the important role that variables like deterrence play in the analysis of AIVs and their consequences, for example, decreasing state-level repression (Kim & Sikkink, 2010 ). Yet as a wealth of psychological research demonstrates, human behavior rarely follows rational-choice models, particularly for normal citizens (rather than elites) in the context of intergroup conflict (e.g., Long & Brecke, 2003) . It is thus extremely difficult to demonstrate, on a state level, that phenomena such as deterrence really drive the effects of, for instance, trials. Although Kim and Sikkink (2010) , among others, attribute the effects of trials on state-level repression to deterrence, they do not persuasively demonstrate that this is the case, mainly because it is almost impossible to directly measure fear of punishment on the state level. Trials and punishment have a whole host of "ingredients" though, for example, signaling and reinforcing norms and values (e.g., Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009 ). The reason that trials and truth commissions in Kim and Sikkink's study have essentially the same effects could be that it is, in both cases, norms that influence state-level repression-rather than deterrence (fear of punishment), in the case of trials, and norms, in the case of truth commission, as the authors argue without clear evidence.
In our model, deterrence is implicitly represented in our categories of norm perceptions and emotions (i.e., fear of punishment), and its behavioral outcome falls under our category of HR compliance (i.e., complying with HR norms for fear of punishment in the event of noncompliance or norm violation). Given that deterrence and its motivating force-fear of punishment-can be measured directly on the individual level, our model thus allows for testing deterrence arguments in a more rigorous way than has been done so far. Therefore, we see its rather indirect treatment in our model as a strength that can help complement past research on AIVs' effects on HR through deterrence. Other commonly discussed state-level, but nonpsychological, effects of AIVs include democratization, institutional reform, and other state-building efforts (Thoms et al., 2010) . These state-level outcomes of AIVs might, in turn, exert direct or indirect influences on HR consciousness and behavior. Again, we believe that such factors can be captured on the individual level, similar to our discussion of deterrence, or on the state level in multilevel studies.
All in all, we concur that there are alternative models. Although we posit that our model is better suited to address the questions in the literature that are most in need of answers, we welcome the possibility that this proposal will spur the creation and empirical tests of alternative, and possibly better, models. Ultimately the fields of postconflict justice and HR will benefit all the more. With this in mind, we now turn to each component of our model.
HR Behavior
Scholarship on AIVs has put a premium on behavioral outcomes-that is, compliance with HR. As an unintended consequence, this focus on HR compliance has conflated two very different HR behaviors: compliance and internalized behavior (Kelman, 2006;  or private and public conformity, respectively, see Asch, 1956, and Sherif, 1936) . HR research has shown that people define rights by evaluating the normality of acts that suggest the (non)existence of a right (Bechlivanou et al., 1990; Doise, 2002 ). This normative influence is then either internalized, through informational social influence, or externalized, through normative social influence (cf. Louis & Taylor, 2004) . Thus, compliance and internalized behavior may look the same at face value: People behave in accordance with HR laws and norms. Yet some people integrate the norms in their belief system, endorsing and becoming committed to HR, whereas others do not (cf. Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; Stellmacher, Sommer, & Brähler, 2005) .
Although this distinction may appear trivial, it can have far-reaching consequences for the (re)establishment of HR in the long term. Behavioral changes are more pronounced, sustained, and generalizable to other domains (e.g., from one HR domain to another; cf. DiazVeizades et al., 1995; McClosky & Brill, 1983) when people internalize rather than externalize norms (e.g., Basu, 1998; Scott, 1971) . For instance, whereas people with a rights-based orientation condemn HR violations independently of contextual factors, others may not do so because of context (e.g., perceived deservingness of victims; Staerklé & Clémence, 2004) . Further, HR norms can only emerge on the group level when the majority of group members internalize the norms. This process is facilitated by peer influence transmitting HR norms (Dunbar, Blanco, Sullaway, & Horcajo, 2004) , as well as greater engagement in promoting HR among people who endorse the norms (cf. Cohrs et al., 2007) . Consequently, future HR violations should be less likely after estab-lishing internalized HR behavior rather than "only" HR compliance.
Moreover, once norms are internalized, they should be less likely to change because of altered group norms, making people less susceptible to group influence. Consequently, even when HR violations become normative in future conflict, people who had previously internalized HR norms should be less likely to participate in HR violations and more likely to actively oppose those who commit them (see also Leidner, Tropp, & Lickel, 2013) . For these reasons, research on AIVs would benefit from distinguishing between HR compliance and internalized HR behavior by assessing the internalization and externalization of HR norms, motivations for engaging in HR behavior, and behaviors related to both HR compliance and internalized HR behavior.
HR Consciousness
AIVs aim to (re)build HR consciousness in postconflict societies because it is commonly assumed that HR consciousness will lead to pro-HR behavior (see also Cohrs et al., 2007) , whereas a lack of HR consciousness can enable or even encourage HR violations (cf. Maoz & McCauley, 2011 ; see also Peterson & Graham, 2011 ). Yet the research on the effects of HR violations on HR consciousness and behavior we reviewed earlier suggests that this link is not as clear or strong as commonly assumed. The reason for this lack of clarity is that HR consciousness does not always come in the same form. Drawing upon HR research on knowledge of, and attitudes toward, HR, we suggest that HR consciousness comes in many different forms that may be best understood in terms of the configuration of HR knowledge, endorsement, commitment, and restriction (see also McFarland, 2015) .
Research on HR as shared social representations finds that knowledge of HR is widely shared across nations and cultures, but that people's positions on HR vary both in the abstract (Doise, 2002; Doise et al., 1999; Spini & Doise, 2005) and the concrete (Clémence, Devos, & Doise, 2001 ). And it is these positions that drive human interactions (i.e., HR behavior; Doise, 2003) . The positions people take on HR are based on three attitudinal dimensions (McFarland & Mathews, 2005) : endorsement (i.e., support for HR), commitment (i.e., support for HR despite possible costs to self or group), and restriction (i.e., support for HR restrictions in emergency situations). Clearly, these different forms of HR consciousness-based on different configurations and degrees of knowledge, endorsement, commitment, and restrictionshould have ramifications for HR behavior in terms of compliance versus internalized behavior. Some research suggests that HR knowledge alone might have positive effects on HR behavior, as HR knowledge predicts behavioral intentions and (self-reported) behavior pertaining to HR (Cohrs et al., 2007; Stellmacher et al., 2005) . However, other research has found HR knowledge to be unrelated to feelings about ethnic outgroups, in particular, and HR, in general (e.g., Dunbar et al., 2004) . It is therefore unclear whether, in a particular postconflict context, HR knowledge would lead to internalized HR behavior, HR compliance, or neither.
"More evolved" forms of HR consciousness (e.g., knowledge coupled with both endorsement and commitment) might be more likely to lead to internalized HR behavior (cf. Clémence et al., 2001) , whereas "less evolved" forms of HR might "only" lead to HR compliance, or not even that. Such a fine-grained view and analysis of HR consciousness could also help explain the frequently encountered principle-application gap between widespread endorsement of HR and the simultaneous debate over HR in specific situations (Clémence et al., 2001) , or the tolerance of HR violations (cf. Staerklé & Clémence, 2004) . This gap might stem from less evolved forms of HR consciousness and could possibly be narrowed by more evolved forms (cf. McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Zaller, 1984) . Furthermore, a fine-grained analysis of HR consciousness can give insights into different ways that people protect themselves and others from HR violations. For instance, people whose HR consciousness allows for restriction of HR in emergencies may be more lenient toward HR violations by the government, and expect institution-based rather than people-based protection against HR violations (see Clémence et al., 2001) . Thus, future research on the effects of AIVs on HR would benefit from this conceptualization and operationalization of HR consciousness in line with research on HR knowledge and attitudes.
AIVs
As alluded to earlier, there is no shortage of TJ/IHL mechanisms (trials, truth commissions, lustration, etc.). Likewise, there are many different versions of any given TJ/IHL mechanism. Some international criminal tribunals have been held in the country in which the conflict took place (e.g., Nuremberg trials, ICTY, Sierra Leone), whereas others have not (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] in Tanzania); some have only prosecuted "top offenders" (e.g., Nuremberg trials), whereas others have also prosecuted "rank-andfile offenders" (e.g., ICTR at first). Some truth commissions have made reconciliation one of their explicit goals (e.g., South Africa), whereas others have not (e.g., Argentina); some have allowed for conditional amnesty as part of the process (e.g., South Africa), whereas others have not (e.g., Chile). This diversity indicates the need to compare different TJ/IHL mechanisms (e.g., trials vs. truth commission) as well as different designs of the same general mechanism.
Most importantly, to investigate whether TJ/ IHL mechanisms can promote HR, they should be compared with situations of impunity. This is important because impunity is (a) a frequently used and logically valid alternative to a TJ/IHL mechanism, and (b) a realistic and meaningful methodological baseline. In this way, research can conclude more assertively whether TJ/IHL mechanisms exert positive effects on HR consciousness or behavior, and, if there is such a link, whether they can eliminate potential negative effects of impunity. In doing so, such research will continue the recent trend in this field to address the problem of confounds or third variables that could be responsible for successes or failures attributed to AIVs in past literature (e.g., amnesty as the possible real reason for the oft-claimed success of the South African TRC; see Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003 . This logic could also be extended to other alternatives of AIVs, such as power sharing, separation or partitioning, demobilization, disarmament, free and fair elections, economic development, or security (see Byman, 1997 Byman, , 2002 Horowitz, 1990; Kaufmann, 1999; Lapidoth, 1997; McRae, 1990) , by comparing AIVs to these strategies as well. As mentioned earlier, the same holds for alternatives developed in a particular context such as Gacaca in Rwanda, which has been shown to improve intergroup relationships and decrease survivor shame and negative outgroup stereotypes (cf. Martin Beristain et al., 2000) . Importantly, combinations of AIVs, for example, truth commissions in combination with trials and amnesties, could also be investigated and compared with their singular application, as recent research that has done so suggests that specific combinations of multiple AIVs may be necessary to affect HR positively (see Hamber, 2009; Olsen et al., 2010b) . By performing comparisons between different AIVs, AIVs and impunity, and/or AIVs and other alternatives, research would also avoid methodological shortcomings of most past TJ research, which has typically investigated single mechanisms, one at a time (cf. Olsen et al., 2010a) .
Appraisals
Large-scale conflict and its aftermath are usually closely looked at by people directly or indirectly affected, even long after the conflict has ended. Thus, AIVs should elicit appraisals in people both in and outside of postconflict societies. In East Timor and Togo, for instance, people saw goals such as the strengthening of HR, knowledge about the violence, and restoring the dignity of both victims and perpetrators very positively (Kpanake & Mullet, 2011; Mullet, Neto, & Pinto, 2008) . Importantly, people also appeared to manage their expectations for the truth commission in these countries (Kpanake & Mullet, 2012; Mullet et al., 2008) . Research on criminal justice (Bass, 2000; Coffee, 1991 ) and large-scale HR violations (Deutsch, 2000; Mikula & Wenzel, 2000) contends that appraisals are crucial in shaping people's attitudes and behavior. Benefits of positively perceived approaches to conflict include increased willingness to reconcile (McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006) and the respect for and commitment to the solution represented by a given approach (Mikula & Wenzel, 2000; Tyler, 1989 Tyler, , 1997 Tyler & Lind, 1992) , even when its decisions may go against the perceivers or their group (Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002) . For example, perceived fairness and perceived truth recovery were the only variables that predicted approval of the amnesty in South Africa (Backer, 2010) .
Similarly, acceptability of conditional amnesties in Togo required the presence of several positive aspects, such as presence versus absence of apology, giving voice to victims, or punishment of perpetrators (Kpanake & Mullet, 2011) . Consequently, the likelihood of future HR violations should decrease. If people appraise an approach negatively, however, they will feel disrespected and marginalized from society (H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1990) . They may lose respect for laws and norms, in general (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Robinson & Darley, 1997) , and for the decisions and outcomes of the approaches, in particular (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 2001; Robinson & Darley, 1997; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1990) . Ultimately, they may take justice into their own hands (i.e., future HR violations in form of "vigilante justice"; cf. Nadler, 2005; Robinson & Darley, 1995; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1996) . Consequently, the potential for future HR violations will increase (cf. Mikula & Wenzel, 2000) . As such, research on AIVs' effects on HR consciousness and internalized HR behavior should measure their qualities as appraised by people.
Group Membership
Appraisals and perceptions vary across people in a systematic way because of people's memberships in social groups (see Hegtvedt, 2005; McFarland, 2015; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Wenzel, 2002) . This is the case even if they all share a general understanding of HR violations and consequences (e.g., Doise et al., 1999; Pankhurst, 1999) . Research on HR has found that people's opinions on HR issues depend on sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, and generation, as well as contextual variables such as the experience of HR violations that delineate oftentimes important groups, such as survivors, perpetrators, or bystanders (e.g., Clé-mence et al., 2001; Doise et al., 1999) . Thus, to understand when, why, and how people appraise an AIV following past HR violations, the complexity and fluidity of identity needs to be considered (see also Clayton & Opotow, 2003) . This assumption receives support by research suggesting that Rwandan perpetrators who participated in Gacaca experienced increased shame and guilt (Kanyangara, 2008) , whereas survivors experienced increased anger and fear (Kanyangara et al., 2007) .
With respect to sociodemographic variables, people may have lived during a conflict or belong to later generations (Shmotkin, Shrira, Goldberg, & Palgi, 2011) . Scholars have distinguished between females' and males' support for HR, in general, and HR restriction, in particular (e.g., Crowson & DeBacker, 2008; Torney-Purta, Wilkenfeld, & Barber, 2008) , or between elites' and normal citizens' gains or losses as a result of adopting pro-or anti-HR approaches during and after conflict (cf. Appel, 2005; Elster, 2004; Stan, 2008) . Similarly, Sierra Leonean elites have been favorable toward their truth commission, whereas normal citizens have been critical of it (Millar, 2010) . In Southern Sudan, people's HR attitudes differed by level of education, language, and geographic location (Pavlish & Ho, 2009 ). Atolagbe and Otubanjo (1984) focused on students as a group that is often particularly sensitive to HR issues and has opportunities to pressure policy and decision makers. Furthermore, restricted and atypical definitions of HR have been found less frequently among older people, suggesting that socialization processes may extend people's definitions of HR (Clémence et al., 2001; Doise et al., 1998) .
With respect to groups delineated by contextual variables, Doise and colleagues (1999) have found that differences in opinions on HR issues depend on the level of human development, cultural values, and self-reported experiences of injustices. Regarding the latter, research should distinguish between (self-or other-identified) victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. 4 Victims and bystanders might appraise TJ/IHL mechanisms more positively than impunity-a hypothesis in line with Sarajevo residents' extremely high perceptions of fairness of the ICTY (Ivković & Hagan, 2006) , and American citizens' tendency to notice and re-ward judges more for over-than for underpunishment (cf. Nalepa, 2012) , suggesting a preference for traditional punishment over other approaches to crime. Importantly, as perpetrators harbor different psychological needs (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009) , moral foundations (Leidner & Castano, 2012) , and notions of justice (Leidner et al., 2010; Li, Leidner, & Petrovic, 2014) than do victims and bystanders, they should differ in their appraisals of AIVs from victims and third parties. Over 60% of Croats, for example, believing that the international community saw them more as perpetrators than victims of Croat-Bosniak violence perceived the ICTY as unfair, compared with only 15% who perceived it as fair (Akhavan, 2001) . Similarly, Kosovar Serbs were half as likely to support the international tribunal as Kosovar Albanians were (United Nations Development Programme, 2007) . Regarding third parties or bystanders, research has suggested that this group might care more about HR of outgroups than HR of their ingroup (Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990) , a phenomenon that could possibly be leveraged to decrease passive and increase active bystandership.
These overlapping and possibly interacting group memberships should color people's appraisals and perceptions of AIVs, ultimately influencing the effectiveness of different AIVs in (re)establishing HR consciousness and behavior. Neglecting these differences will almost certainly lead to failed or underperforming AIVs, whereas accounting for and understanding them might open pathways to more nuanced and, therefore, better-performing AIVs.
Interindividual Differences
Even within the same group, people's appraisals and perceptions of AIVs will vary based on their individual psychological makeup. Thus, appraisals of AIVs and their consequences for HR consciousness and behavior should vary not only between but also within groups, depending on the group members' interindividual differences, such as political ideology, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, or their level of identification with their group. In the context of HR violations, these interindividual differences manifest in form of people's HR orientations (see McFarland, 2015) . Right-wing authoritarianism and conservatism, for instance, have been shown to be negatively associated with pro-HR attitudes and HR endorsement and commitment, while being positively associated with HR restriction (see McFarland, 2015) . Similarly, the need for cognition and structure, political party identification, and patriotism and nationalism are also associated with HR attitudes (see McFarland, 2015) . As interindividual differences lead to different HR orientations, and to different appraisals and perceptions in many intergroup contexts (cf. , we believe that they should also lead to different appraisals of AIVs and, subsequently, different levels of HR consciousness and behavior. It is thus important to assess people's preexisting HR belief and attitudinal systems when investigating the effects of AIVs on HR consciousness and behavior. In this way, although our model focuses on the link from AIVs to HR, it also allows researchers to account for people's preexisting HR orientations and their moderating effects on the impact of AIVs on HR.
Perceptions of Ingroup and Outgroup Norms, Views of the Outgroup, and Emotions Toward Ingroup and Outgroup
As mentioned, the literature on AIVs suffers from a lack of theorizing as to how the hypothesized effects on HR should emerge. We have already hypothesized that the effects are mediated by appraisals of AIVs, which themselves should be moderated by group membership and relevant interindividual differences. Yet it is unclear exactly how appraisals and perceptions affect HR consciousness and behavior. We propose that motivated cognitions and emotions drive these effects. By incorporating cognitions and emotions in future research on the link between AIVs and HR, assumptions about the "soft" effects of TJ/IHL mechanisms with regard to positive emotionality can finally be tested empirically.
With respect to perceptions, AIV appraisals should influence perceived ingroup and outgroup norms, and views of the outgroup. Positively appraised AIVs might, for instance, facilitate (re)humanization of the outgroup, or decrease attributions of blame and responsibility to the outgroup. Most importantly, AIVs should set norms that affect HR behavior (Akhavan, 2001; Martin Beristain et al., 2000) . Specifically, positively appraised AIVs, in particular, should set norms that are more likely to be internalized, and therefore more likely to lead to internalized HR behavior rather than HR compliance (cf. Louis & Taylor, 2004) . In support of the general assumption, norms have been shown to decrease state-level repression through the use of trials and truth commissions (Kim & Sikkink, 2010) . In support of the more specific assumption, research has identified (perceived) norms and views of the outgroup as a key factor in motivating and facilitating HR behavior (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1990; Colson, 2000; Kelman, 1973; Staub, 1990) , leading to opposition to large-scale HR violations (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Č ehajić, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2009; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Leidner et al., 2010; Leidner & Castano, et al., 2013) . Interestingly, negatively appraised AIVs might also set norms, similar to the norm-setting capacity of punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004 ). Yet norms set by negatively appraised AIVs should be less likely to be internalized, and therefore more likely to lead to HR compliance rather than internalized HR behavior. This possibility points to the potential that an AIV might improve future HR behavior both for groups that appraise it negatively (compliance) and for groups that appraise it positively (internalized behavior).
Related to norm-setting within a group, AIV appraisals should also affect perceived outgroup norms. A positively appraised AIV should be more likely to strengthen the belief that the outgroup follows basic norms such as the respect for human life and dignity, and consequently reaffirm the previously eroded belief that the ingroup and outgroup have shared values (Elcheroth, 2006; Wenzel et al., 2008 , which has been identified as a strong predictor of HR behavior (Peterson & Graham, 2011; Sobek et al., 2006) . Accordingly, positively appraised AIVs should improve HR consciousness and behavior through (perceived) norms. Hence, norm perceptions should be assessed in future research.
With respect to emotions, witnessing and learning about violence often elicits anger, outrage, fear, shame, guilt, and humiliation (Feather, 2006; Mikula, 1986; Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998) . Recent research (e.g., appraisal tendency theory; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003) suggests that emotional responses can have powerful effects on attitudes and behaviors (for a review, see Glaser & Salovey, 1998) directed toward outgroups (e.g., Haidt, 2003; E. R. Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007) . Studies have consistently found an effect of, for example, anger, on blaming the outgroup for both the creation of the conflict and failures of nonviolent conflict resolution attempts (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006) , as well as on support for punitive and military measures (e.g., Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006) . Indeed, anger is also strongly related to the endorsement of the act of killing itself (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008) . In line with these findings, AIVs have been shown to induce strong emotional reactions among participants and members of the broader society, and thereby contribute to the consolidation of norms (Martin Beristain et al., 2000; Páez, Basabe, Ubillos, & González-Castro, 2007) .
Based on this past research on emotions, in general, and those induced by AIVs, in particular, negatively appraised AIVs should lead to more anger (cf. Kanyangara et al., 2007) , which, in turn, should lower people's HR consciousness and decrease their HR compliance and internalized HR behavior (cf. Averill, 1982; Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Gromet & Darley, 2009 ). Conversely, positively appraised AIVs should decrease anger, which, in turn, should improve people's HR consciousness and increase their HR compliance and internalized HR behavior. AIVs can also induce fear (Kanyangara et al., 2007) , which should be particularly important for negatively, but possibly not for positively, appraised AIVs; in turn, fear of the outgroup should facilitate future conflict only when the conflict is not fully resolved (Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010) . Fear of punishment after trials, on the other hand, might serve as a deterrent rather than instigator of future conflict, as rational-choice models would suggest. Anticipating punishment of one's own transgressions, however, can also lead to undesirable consequences, such as further fueling aggression (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Cermak, & Rosza, 2001 ), either as a response to frustration or as a means to avoid being victimized by punishment (Berkowitz, 1993; Patterson, 1982) .
Underlying outgroup-directed emotions is empathy, the ability to experience an emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of others (Batson, 1991 ; see also Loewenstein & Small, 2007) . It has frequently been suggested that, to be successful, AIVs should create space for empathy (e.g., Staub, 2004 Staub, , 2005 . This goal should be facilitated by positive appraisals of an AIV, as such appraisals would suggest to the appraiser that the past score between ingroup and outgroup has been "settled" (if not forgotten). Empathy has been demonstrated to prompt prosocial behaviors (e.g., Batson, 1998) , and improve intergroup attitudes by softening the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; González, Manzi, & Noor, 2011; Stephan & Finlay, 1999) and fostering cross-group contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008) , even in violent conflicts (Tam et al., 2008) . Similarly, perspective taking has been shown to decrease tolerance of, and increase reparation motivations for, ingroupcommitted violence (Berndsen & McGarty, 2012; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008) , and to reduce revenge motivations in response to outgroup-committed violence (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2011) . Both empathy and perspective taking motivate intergroup trust (Kelman, 1999; Kramer, 1999) and reconciliation (Č ehajić, Brown, & Castano, 2008; Noor, Brown, González, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Staub et al., 2005) , even after large-scale intergroup violence (Vonofakou et al., 2008) . Thus, positively appraised AIVs should improve HR consciousness and behavior through increasing empathy and perspective taking.
In addition to outgroup-directed emotions, AIV appraisals might also influence ingroupdirected emotions. Negatively appraised AIVs should be more likely to elicit ingroup-directed emotions such as shame, guilt, or humiliation. Perpetrators, for instance, might feel humiliated or ashamed by (some) TJ/IHL mechanisms, whereas victims might feel humiliated or ashamed by impunity. Like anger, these emotions should then influence HR consciousness and behavior. For example, shame motivates people to distance themselves from the source of shame (Tangney & Fischer, 1995) . In intergroup contexts, this distancing can take a number of different forms, including a decrease in ingroup identification and an increase in support for withdrawal from conflict (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) . Therefore, shame experienced by perpetrators in response to TJ/ IHL mechanisms might at least lead to HR compliance, if not necessarily to HR consciousness or internalized HR behavior. The same might not be true for shame experienced by victims in response to impunity, however, in which case shame might lead to less HR compliance and internalized HR behavior. This hypothesis also illustrates the viability of the current framework to make predictions that can extend past research (e.g., finding boundary conditions of the withdrawal effects of shame). Thus, it would be useful to assess both outgroup-and ingroup-directed emotions in future research, as has recently been done, for instance, by Kanyangara and colleagues (2007) .
Conclusion
Against the background of the use of realpolitik and TJ/IHL approaches to (re)build HR consciousness and behavior after large-scale HR violations, we have linked the two separate bodies of multidisciplinary literature on AIVs and HR in order to provide an integrative framework for past and future research. Findings from HR research point to the importance of the distinction between different forms of HR behavior: a multidimensional conceptualization of HR consciousness based on HR knowledge, endorsement, commitment, and restriction; variables delineating different groups and their respective reactions to AIVs; and important interindividual difference variables. Although we consider this framework a first step in inspiring more rigorous research on the AIV-HR link, we are aware that our framework is only that-a first step. In fact, it is our hope that this framework will inspire research(ers) to critique and improve it, extend it to other contexts (e.g., other domains of HR violations), and, in doing so, further our understanding of the relationship between approaches to HR violations and the (re)establishment of HR consciousness and behavior.
